Reform or Re-form?
An Op-Ed on Organizational Reviews and Outcomes
by Fouad Kronfol
by Fouad Kronfol
UNICEF is constantly working to maintain its place among UN agencies, and to assert its leadership role for children among the NGO/civil society world. To do this, UNICEF periodically embarks on major organization-wide reviews, as well as a variety of sectoral or functional studies (personnel, supply, external relations, fund-raising).
In order to give more credence to these reviews, UNICEF hires external consultants to carry out the tasks, to ensure both professionalism and objectivity. In its 75 years of existence UNICEF has embarked on four major externally conducted reviews, each carried out under a different leadership viz. 1960 under Maurice Pate, 1973 under Henry Labouisse, 1994 under James Grant, and 2006 under Ann Venneman. The periodicity of these reviews reflects both a desire for some internal soul-searching and for reforming various aspects of the organization. The first three studies were carried out well into the tenure of the then Executive Director; only the latest study was carried out early in the term of the incumbent Executive Director (although it could be argued that given the relatively shorter tenure of Carol Bellamy, the issues being looked into probably would have sparked the study anyway had she stayed on as long as her predecessors). It is, however, a moot point.
One common trait has been that the studies were carried out at a time when staff morale was not at its best, or when UNICEF stakeholders were critical of certain aspects of its work, or both. The results of the studies and the implementation of the consultants’ recommendations has been uneven, giving rise to a certain degree of skepticism among both the staff and the stakeholders. Therefore this begs the question: was it Reform or Re-Form ???
While the previous studies brought out major issues (or challenges as they are now called) faced by the organization on a variety of fronts, the diagnoses and recommendations were sometimes presented in the “buzz-word “ terminology of management consultants and the use of glib acronyms. The usual response of UNICEF management has been to embark on seemingly reformist actions which over a short time period metamorphosed into the usual bureaucratic behavior, so that the circle of causal factors, inability or unwillingness to resolve root problems, and general discontentment started all over again.
A look back at the periods of tenure of each previous Executive Director in UNICEF reveals that every one of them led the organization during a changing global environment and with UNICEF in a different stage of evolution:
In looking at issues and recommendations for action, it is helpful to remind oneself that some things about UNICEF are givens and will not likely change:
Experience has shown, however, that as far as staff and structures are concerned, most important changes have occurred from shifts in programme emphases rather than as a result of management reviews. Thus, in the early years the largest programme unit in HQ was the Food Conservation Division when milk distribution, milk processing and weaning food plants were a big part of UNICEF’s aid. At other early periods, involvement with malaria and various disease control activities saw a major increase in staffing with engineers, transport officers, mechanics etc. The move from health to other sectors such as education, social welfare, young child care, nutrition, non-formal education, water and sanitation etc. saw a major increase in staff for these activities. After the 1964 Bellagio Conference, planning for children in national development became another major area. The “basic services strategy” adopted in the late 1970’s was another important programmatic change which greatly affected staffing and structures. The advent of Child Survival & Development as well as the Universal Child Immunization campaign gave an important boost to staff in the fields of GOBI (growth monitoring, oral rehydration therapy, breast feeding and immunization) as well as in social mobilization, vaccination, cold chain etc. With the CRC came another wave of staff and programmes related to protection issues. Along-side the regular developmental programmes, staffing and structures over the years have been considerably influenced by actions in both natural and man-made emergencies. In many cases, UNICEF emergency actions preceded or opened the way for regular programmes and the opening of offices in the affected countries.
Closely related to the preceding and another major factor affecting organizational change is programme funding. Up until the late 1970’s, UNICEF operated exclusively on its general resources income (today’s regular funds). It was the advent of “notings”, the receipt of “specific purpose contributions” (today’s other resources ) and funds-in-trust etc. which affected the way the organization’s staff and structures developed and the emphasis given to programme activities funded by these special contributions often shaped major changes in structures, staffing and procedures. Over the years, in fact, the proportion of regular funds has decreased as more income came for specific purpose activities. This trend has been a worrisome reality for UNICEF management as it greatly limits the organization's leeway in planning and programming in general. In 2020 the regular budget was only 16% of the annual income of UNICEF.
The geographical (physical) expansion of UNICEF activities is another important factor affecting its structures and staffing. While the gradual extension of UNICEF work into developing countries was steady since the early 1950’s, there were three periods when major and accelerated expansion materially affected the organization’s policies, structures and staffing:
One aspect of UNICEF’s evolution which has been influenced by these management reviews is on the structural side. One of the most important changes that have affected the organization’s setup (apart from the office expansions and technological changes indicated above) has been the evolution of its regional offices. Their size, location, configuration and role have undergone many transformations in the past 75 years and, as a consequence, have affected staff in numerous ways. As UNICEF “grew out” of New York HQ to work in the “field” it initially set up a few offices which by virtue of their location became “regional” in nature as they served a number of countries. These offices steadily grew with the organization’s own increases in resources and staffing.
In 1960, the first externally conducted Study, (carried out by Laurence Mitchelmore) however, recommended doing away with the “middle tier” and advocated a two-tier structure with strengthened country/area offices dealing directly with HQ. This was not wholly implemented, but regional offices were considerably reduced in size and their staff and functions moved to country offices and HQ. By the 1970’s the regional structures had again grown giving rise to tensions within the organization, and so another Study was completed in 1973 by external consultants (Swedish Institute of Administrative Research). Their findings echoed the earlier review but did not recommend abolishment of the middle tier; instead they prescribed a much reduced staffing and role making the regional directors “Senior Professional Colleagues” with much emphasis on Knowledge Networks among field offices. Once again, UNICEF down-sized its regional setup, giving more authority to country offices in the process.
By the end of the 1980’s the regional entities had again burgeoned and when the 1994 Booz-Allen Study was carried out, their recommendation was that if UNICEF wished to maintain these offices it needed to strengthen and increase the regional setup. Thus in the 1990’s the pendulum again swung the other way and UNICEF in fact considerably bolstered the role and authority of the middle tier, giving it both programming and operational oversight.
Early in the tenure of the new Executive Director, Ann Veneman, UNICEF embarked on a series of reviews of functional areas (human resources, supply, research, civil society partnership, gender, etc.). It then decided to carry out a broad-based organizational review to map out its strategies, taking into account the other studies. This was carried out in 2006/7 by an external firm GivingWorks Inc. Its take on regional offices: they have insufficient programme oversight, quality assurance and monitoring and thus an uneven quality of regional technical support. Various suggestions for improving their performance were being discussed.
An important fact to bear in mind concerning the latest Study is that it was happening at the same time as a major UN Reform movement. While this exercise and the Millennium Development Goals were very important as the backdrop to UNICEF’s evolution, both were essentially “road maps” with a fairly long-term outlook and quite broad in their makeup to directly and quickly affect UNICEF organizational change.
Another feature of regional offices in UNICEF has been the many changes in their location and the resulting effects on staff, working methods etc. Examples which spring to mind are: European Office (from Paris to Geneva); EAPRO (from Manila to Bangkok); MENARO (from Beirut to Amman); SCARO (from Delhi to Kathmandu); TACRO ( from New York to Santiago to Bogotá to Panama City); Africa (from Lagos to ESARO & WCARO); ESARO (from Kampala to Nairobi); and WCARO (from Brazzaville to Abidjan to Dakar).
This piece is based on my personal interest and involvement with the four organization-wide studies that I have known about. I have read the reports of all four and followed their consequences and the organization's development in their aftermath. As for the Booz-Allen study, this was probably the most thorough and consequential of the four. I was privileged to be directly involved in all its aspects for the entire period it took place as the in-house "sherpa" guiding, assisting, facilitating, providing information, organizing field visits, setting up their meetings with managers and staff etc.
Two main points that I have retained from all these studies are: while the external consultants brought expertise in management and neutral objectivity to their work, most such firms/individuals had their grounding in western commercial and for-profit management with much less knowledge and understanding of the international setup and culture of UNICEF and its non-profit organizational makeup; most of these consultants appeared to have a very limited knowledge of the real situations in the developing countries where UNICEF's main activities take place. As a result their reviews were largely coloured by UNICEF setup and work in the main HQ and regional offices locations.
It is hoped that in future, when and if new organization-wide studies are undertaken the consultants will place their emphases on actions that will enable UNICEF to continue doing what it does best. One should remember, moreover, that whatever change is prescribed, it has to be accepted by staff, supported by the other stakeholders and implemented by management.
How all this will play out in the next quarter century is the BIG QUESTION. But as UNICEF looks beyond its 75th year of existence it is hoped that such studies and reviews will help the organization chart for itself a course that will materially enhance the “GOODNESS” that is intrinsic to its being.
Because let us all agree that UNICEF is a good institution, it has a good mission, it has a good clientele, it has a good outreach, it has a good culture, it has a good reputation, it has good staff, it provides good support to those who need it, it has good skills. It should not become a victim of its own success.
In order to give more credence to these reviews, UNICEF hires external consultants to carry out the tasks, to ensure both professionalism and objectivity. In its 75 years of existence UNICEF has embarked on four major externally conducted reviews, each carried out under a different leadership viz. 1960 under Maurice Pate, 1973 under Henry Labouisse, 1994 under James Grant, and 2006 under Ann Venneman. The periodicity of these reviews reflects both a desire for some internal soul-searching and for reforming various aspects of the organization. The first three studies were carried out well into the tenure of the then Executive Director; only the latest study was carried out early in the term of the incumbent Executive Director (although it could be argued that given the relatively shorter tenure of Carol Bellamy, the issues being looked into probably would have sparked the study anyway had she stayed on as long as her predecessors). It is, however, a moot point.
One common trait has been that the studies were carried out at a time when staff morale was not at its best, or when UNICEF stakeholders were critical of certain aspects of its work, or both. The results of the studies and the implementation of the consultants’ recommendations has been uneven, giving rise to a certain degree of skepticism among both the staff and the stakeholders. Therefore this begs the question: was it Reform or Re-Form ???
While the previous studies brought out major issues (or challenges as they are now called) faced by the organization on a variety of fronts, the diagnoses and recommendations were sometimes presented in the “buzz-word “ terminology of management consultants and the use of glib acronyms. The usual response of UNICEF management has been to embark on seemingly reformist actions which over a short time period metamorphosed into the usual bureaucratic behavior, so that the circle of causal factors, inability or unwillingness to resolve root problems, and general discontentment started all over again.
A look back at the periods of tenure of each previous Executive Director in UNICEF reveals that every one of them led the organization during a changing global environment and with UNICEF in a different stage of evolution:
- M. Pate; the post-war emergency phase and the consolidation of UNICEF as a permanent UN agency;
- H. Labouisse; the era of UN Development Decades and the expansion of UNICEF work from health to other sectors, including planning for children in national development, as well as the physical extension of its setup in the world;
- J. Grant; the transformation of UNICEF from its “basic services approach” to one focused on "child survival" together with an important advocacy element giving primacy to the child on the world’s political agenda;
- C.Bellamy; the advent of the Convention on Rights of the Child and the initiation of rights-based programming, coupled with major organizational/ procedural changes in the UN and within UNICEF;
- A.Venneman ; UN Reform and Millennium Development Goals were important elements affecting UNICEF.
In looking at issues and recommendations for action, it is helpful to remind oneself that some things about UNICEF are givens and will not likely change:
- it is a UN agency and will be affected by UN reform, MDG, SDG or other system-wide matters;
- its mandate and mission will remain focused on children and youth;
- its policies emanate from multi-national councils, and from its own experiences;
- its “culture” is international in nature as it emanates from different sources and geographical areas.
- it has powerful advocacy instruments, e.g. CRC;
- it is funded by voluntary contributions and its revenue comes from governmental, inter-governmental and private sectors, the ratios of which have vacillated throughout its existence;
- it is budget-driven and operates mainly on a short-term (annual) basis, although its administrative budget is biennial and its programmes are planned for up to five years;
- its programme includes both developmental and emergency aspects, their respective proportions being dictated by both external events and policies;
- its programme management is an interplay of both geographical and substantive/ technical aspects;
- it is a bureaucracy with a non-profit organization’s make-up;
- its rules and regulations are heavily codified and emanate from a civil service setup;
- its programme is essentially country-based (although both regional and global projects exist);
- it best carries out its mission/mandate in collaboration with other entities (UN, governmental, NGO etc.) because of its relatively small size and budget;
- its basic setup and structures have not changed in seven plus decades with essentially a three-tier system (increasingly, a fourth sub-national presence has grown especially in larger countries and with a variety of “area-based” activities);
- while it is an acknowledged leader in advocacy and activities for children, it is neither a “UN specialized agency” nor “the” NGO/CSO per se;
- its assistance components consist of supplies, cash grants, expertise and advocacy, the proportions of which are function of the local country situation.
Experience has shown, however, that as far as staff and structures are concerned, most important changes have occurred from shifts in programme emphases rather than as a result of management reviews. Thus, in the early years the largest programme unit in HQ was the Food Conservation Division when milk distribution, milk processing and weaning food plants were a big part of UNICEF’s aid. At other early periods, involvement with malaria and various disease control activities saw a major increase in staffing with engineers, transport officers, mechanics etc. The move from health to other sectors such as education, social welfare, young child care, nutrition, non-formal education, water and sanitation etc. saw a major increase in staff for these activities. After the 1964 Bellagio Conference, planning for children in national development became another major area. The “basic services strategy” adopted in the late 1970’s was another important programmatic change which greatly affected staffing and structures. The advent of Child Survival & Development as well as the Universal Child Immunization campaign gave an important boost to staff in the fields of GOBI (growth monitoring, oral rehydration therapy, breast feeding and immunization) as well as in social mobilization, vaccination, cold chain etc. With the CRC came another wave of staff and programmes related to protection issues. Along-side the regular developmental programmes, staffing and structures over the years have been considerably influenced by actions in both natural and man-made emergencies. In many cases, UNICEF emergency actions preceded or opened the way for regular programmes and the opening of offices in the affected countries.
Closely related to the preceding and another major factor affecting organizational change is programme funding. Up until the late 1970’s, UNICEF operated exclusively on its general resources income (today’s regular funds). It was the advent of “notings”, the receipt of “specific purpose contributions” (today’s other resources ) and funds-in-trust etc. which affected the way the organization’s staff and structures developed and the emphasis given to programme activities funded by these special contributions often shaped major changes in structures, staffing and procedures. Over the years, in fact, the proportion of regular funds has decreased as more income came for specific purpose activities. This trend has been a worrisome reality for UNICEF management as it greatly limits the organization's leeway in planning and programming in general. In 2020 the regular budget was only 16% of the annual income of UNICEF.
The geographical (physical) expansion of UNICEF activities is another important factor affecting its structures and staffing. While the gradual extension of UNICEF work into developing countries was steady since the early 1950’s, there were three periods when major and accelerated expansion materially affected the organization’s policies, structures and staffing:
- in the mid-1980’s when UNICEF embarked on a tremendous expansion of its operational network, funds and staffing in Africa, which in a short term saw a virtual tripling of resources in sub-Saharan Africa with a concomitant increase in offices and staffing. This was followed by an appreciable though less dramatic expansion in Latin America and the Caribbean region;
- another was in the early 1990’s with the creation of the CEE/CIS Region in Europe and the initiation of programme cooperation with a substantial number of newly formed countries in that part of the world;
- the third was the coming into effect of the CRC which opened a whole new area of child protection actions and led UNICEF to increased presence and work in better-off countries.
One aspect of UNICEF’s evolution which has been influenced by these management reviews is on the structural side. One of the most important changes that have affected the organization’s setup (apart from the office expansions and technological changes indicated above) has been the evolution of its regional offices. Their size, location, configuration and role have undergone many transformations in the past 75 years and, as a consequence, have affected staff in numerous ways. As UNICEF “grew out” of New York HQ to work in the “field” it initially set up a few offices which by virtue of their location became “regional” in nature as they served a number of countries. These offices steadily grew with the organization’s own increases in resources and staffing.
In 1960, the first externally conducted Study, (carried out by Laurence Mitchelmore) however, recommended doing away with the “middle tier” and advocated a two-tier structure with strengthened country/area offices dealing directly with HQ. This was not wholly implemented, but regional offices were considerably reduced in size and their staff and functions moved to country offices and HQ. By the 1970’s the regional structures had again grown giving rise to tensions within the organization, and so another Study was completed in 1973 by external consultants (Swedish Institute of Administrative Research). Their findings echoed the earlier review but did not recommend abolishment of the middle tier; instead they prescribed a much reduced staffing and role making the regional directors “Senior Professional Colleagues” with much emphasis on Knowledge Networks among field offices. Once again, UNICEF down-sized its regional setup, giving more authority to country offices in the process.
By the end of the 1980’s the regional entities had again burgeoned and when the 1994 Booz-Allen Study was carried out, their recommendation was that if UNICEF wished to maintain these offices it needed to strengthen and increase the regional setup. Thus in the 1990’s the pendulum again swung the other way and UNICEF in fact considerably bolstered the role and authority of the middle tier, giving it both programming and operational oversight.
Early in the tenure of the new Executive Director, Ann Veneman, UNICEF embarked on a series of reviews of functional areas (human resources, supply, research, civil society partnership, gender, etc.). It then decided to carry out a broad-based organizational review to map out its strategies, taking into account the other studies. This was carried out in 2006/7 by an external firm GivingWorks Inc. Its take on regional offices: they have insufficient programme oversight, quality assurance and monitoring and thus an uneven quality of regional technical support. Various suggestions for improving their performance were being discussed.
An important fact to bear in mind concerning the latest Study is that it was happening at the same time as a major UN Reform movement. While this exercise and the Millennium Development Goals were very important as the backdrop to UNICEF’s evolution, both were essentially “road maps” with a fairly long-term outlook and quite broad in their makeup to directly and quickly affect UNICEF organizational change.
Another feature of regional offices in UNICEF has been the many changes in their location and the resulting effects on staff, working methods etc. Examples which spring to mind are: European Office (from Paris to Geneva); EAPRO (from Manila to Bangkok); MENARO (from Beirut to Amman); SCARO (from Delhi to Kathmandu); TACRO ( from New York to Santiago to Bogotá to Panama City); Africa (from Lagos to ESARO & WCARO); ESARO (from Kampala to Nairobi); and WCARO (from Brazzaville to Abidjan to Dakar).
This piece is based on my personal interest and involvement with the four organization-wide studies that I have known about. I have read the reports of all four and followed their consequences and the organization's development in their aftermath. As for the Booz-Allen study, this was probably the most thorough and consequential of the four. I was privileged to be directly involved in all its aspects for the entire period it took place as the in-house "sherpa" guiding, assisting, facilitating, providing information, organizing field visits, setting up their meetings with managers and staff etc.
Two main points that I have retained from all these studies are: while the external consultants brought expertise in management and neutral objectivity to their work, most such firms/individuals had their grounding in western commercial and for-profit management with much less knowledge and understanding of the international setup and culture of UNICEF and its non-profit organizational makeup; most of these consultants appeared to have a very limited knowledge of the real situations in the developing countries where UNICEF's main activities take place. As a result their reviews were largely coloured by UNICEF setup and work in the main HQ and regional offices locations.
It is hoped that in future, when and if new organization-wide studies are undertaken the consultants will place their emphases on actions that will enable UNICEF to continue doing what it does best. One should remember, moreover, that whatever change is prescribed, it has to be accepted by staff, supported by the other stakeholders and implemented by management.
How all this will play out in the next quarter century is the BIG QUESTION. But as UNICEF looks beyond its 75th year of existence it is hoped that such studies and reviews will help the organization chart for itself a course that will materially enhance the “GOODNESS” that is intrinsic to its being.
Because let us all agree that UNICEF is a good institution, it has a good mission, it has a good clientele, it has a good outreach, it has a good culture, it has a good reputation, it has good staff, it provides good support to those who need it, it has good skills. It should not become a victim of its own success.
Fouad Jan
ReplyDeleteCongratulations on your very informative article on UN reform. In my opinion the special strength of UNICEF derives from (a) the country approach (b) decentralized programme management (c) partnerships with civil societies and (d) affinities with communities.
Through its flexibility, it has shown resilience and adaptability to emerging situations. I believe Bellamy' s greatest contribution was her mainstreaming of the CRC.
Best wishes to you and all those who contributed to the last quarterly issue of News and Views.
Baquer
Many Thanks indeed Baquer Jan,
ReplyDeleteThe whole Quarterly was, as always, a Team effort and in fact with a much smaller role for me this time around. Both Tom and Detlef did most of the heavy lifting, while Gianni, Sree and Doreen were responsible for some major editing and writing.
I totally agree with you about what makes UNICEF special among the UN System, and hope that present and future generations of leaders and staff will maintain the course and continue to keep UNICEF a leader for children world wide.
Stay well, my friend. Ghorbanet
Fouad